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Author Topic: Rusija o modernizaciji vojske  (Read 194077 times)
 
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dzumba
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« Reply #1470 on: November 06, 2018, 06:06:37 pm »

Права порука овог текста је да је потребно одвојити још пара у војноиндустријски комплекс САД јер: "видите да нас Руси шију".
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« Reply #1471 on: November 14, 2018, 10:57:41 am »


U izradi superkompjuter za rusko naoružanje



Rusija želi da potpuno prebaci čitav ciklus izrade i proizvodnje na domaću opremu — počevši od naučno-istraživačke faze, pa sve do stvaranja prototipa.

Rusija pravi savremeni superkompjuter za projektovanje perspektivnog naoružanja, saopštila je Sputnjiku generalna direktorka kompanije „Molnija“, koja ulazi u sastav koncerna „Kalašnjikov“, Olga Sokolova.

„U radu na ovom projektu sarađujemo sa sa Institutom za elektronske mašine ’I.S. Bruka‘, akcionarskim društvom MCST’, akcionarskim društvom ‘Informacioni satelitski sistemi akademika M.F. Rešetnjova’ i drugim“, navela je Sokolova.

Glavni cilj projekta — potpuno prebaciti čitav ciklus izrade i proizvodnje na domaću opremu — počevši od naučno-istraživačke faze, pa sve do stvaranja prototipa, njegovog testiranja i praćenja eksploatacije serijskih proizvoda u vojsci.

„Počećemo sa raketama-metama, a zatim ćemo predlagati ta rešenja čitavoj ruskoj industriji. Treba reći da već postoje ozbiljni rezultati u tom pravcu, ali zasad neću otkrivati detalje. Samo ću reći da nalazimo na razumevanje kod partnera i naručioca", dodala je Sokolova.

Proizvod se može pojaviti u narednih pet godina.

izvor
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« Reply #1472 on: November 14, 2018, 12:37:20 pm »


CAD/CAM se primenjuje već 30 godina, ne znam šta je tu novo.
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dzumba
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« Reply #1473 on: November 15, 2018, 09:44:04 pm »

Па, мало пропаганде за неупућене...
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« Reply #1474 on: November 18, 2018, 05:59:02 pm »


CAD/CAM se primenjuje već 30 godina, ne znam šta je tu novo.

Što bi rekao Zoran Ramdilović, promašio si fabulu radnje.

Ne kažu oni da do sada nisu koristili CAM/CAD, već da će preći u potpunosti na domaću opremu u izradi superkompjutera.

Neće koristiti strane superkompjutere, koristiće svoj, i neće koristiti strane komponente u izradi istog.
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Milan (longtrip)
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« Reply #1475 on: November 18, 2018, 06:43:56 pm »

MO RF je ove godine uvelo novinu u koncepciji projektovanja i proizvodnje BTR, BMP i lakih oklopnih vozila. Prelazi se na maksimalni kalibar 57mm

opširnije na ruskom ovde



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« Reply #1476 on: November 18, 2018, 07:48:38 pm »



Renesansa topa S-60 iz 1945. godine! Ukoliko imaju novi SUV i novu municiju, onda je to sasvim u redu.
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« Reply #1477 on: November 22, 2018, 12:28:33 am »


Фрегата Касатонов, једна од нових корвета и помоћни брод у опремању у Северном бродоградилишту, Санкт Петербург.


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MOTORISTA
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« Reply #1478 on: November 26, 2018, 09:27:20 am »

Ruske balističke podmornice na stanju 01.11.2018.


* Ruske nuklearke.jpg (350.48 KB. 1164x765 - viewed 29 times.)

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lovac
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« Reply #1479 on: November 29, 2018, 09:19:56 pm »

Ne znam baš dobro ruski, ali ako sam dobro shvatio Rusija ima samo 9 operativnih balističkih podmornica ?!

Kolko ima ukupno operativnih podmornica?
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« Reply #1480 on: November 29, 2018, 09:25:44 pm »

Mogu dati ovde skinut spisak sa "Covert shores", mada je na tom spisku broj DEP 877/636 Kilo preuveličan za dve P. Navodno je stanje na 01. nov.2018. Navodno ima 11 borbenih SSBN, ali je jedna na TOF Delta III (667BDR) - Kalmar i očekuje se njeno povlačenje 2019. SAD imaju 14 SSBN klase Ohio i još 4 pregrađene u AP specijalne namene, od kojih bar jedna kao SSGN.  14 prema 11 ne vidim kao veliku razliku, tim pre što su kod Rusa 4 nove tipa  955, a najmlađa SSBN RM SAD ima 25 godina. Dmitrij Donski pr-941 Akula/Typhoon služi za ispitivanje novih raketa Bulava i ne smatra se operativnom SSBN. Stara je 35 godina.

Postujem i shemu specijalne AP pr.09852 Belgorod. Na shemi je napisano za šta će se koristiti. Iskorišćena je nedovršena SSGN Oscar II i pregrađena u ovo čudo. Tek je završena.

SSN pr.885 i pr.949A su  takođe SSGN, očekuje se preoružavanje Oscara sa Kalibrom. Ako se krca Kalibr umesto Onyxa sve te P takođe mogu obavljati strategijske misije ako je BG nuklearna, što je prosta modifikacija u remontnom zavodu.

Rusi imaju znatno manje SSN od SAD, ali to je danak dvodecenijskom zaostajanju. I ovaj broj je dovoljan i opet veći od broja  kineskih, britanskih i francuskih SSN uzetih zajedno.


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« Reply #1481 on: December 02, 2018, 02:42:22 pm »



Бочна пројекција и уздужни пресек нове класе руских ДЕП - пр.677 - Лада.


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« Reply #1482 on: December 02, 2018, 07:52:22 pm »

Nemam neko stručno znanje o podmornicama, ali sam ubeđen da su dizel-električne podmornice (njihov pogon) tehnološki prevaziđene.
Zašto rusi grade nove projekte takvih podmornica?
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« Reply #1483 on: December 02, 2018, 08:26:18 pm »



Руси их граде зато што немају спреман и довољно развијен АИП систем погона за практичну примену. Сем тога, све новије подморнице са АИП погоном такође имају и ДЕГ и батерије. АИП погон на данашњем ступњу развоја омогућава доплов под водом до око 1500НМ, малим до средњим брзинама, не брже од 8 чворова типично. 1500НМ је мало, чак су и ЈРМ П којима је доплов био другостепени параметар имале знатно већи доплов у подводној вожњи са шноркелом. ДЕП пр.677 има подводни доплов од чак 650НМ при 3 чв., што је веома добар резултат.

Такође, код ДЕП батерије не одају никакав шум, једини извор шума је ПЕМ (и хидродинамички шум кретања). Код АИП подморница шума нема само код горивих ћелија, а Стирлинг и МЕСМА погон имају одређени ниво шума. А све оне ипак имају ПЕМ који шуми (и хидродинамички шум).

Кад је ДЕП тиха, онда је стварно тиха! 
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« Reply #1484 on: December 02, 2018, 08:47:29 pm »

Пренећу овде у целости текст са портала https://southfront.org/ који је на енглеском језику (превод са руског, али нисам успео наћи руски оригинал) а односи се на ново правило борбене употребе тактичких јединица.

Према мишљењу аутора овим правилом се Руска војска битно одмакла од совјетске доктрине и правила употребе тактичких јединица (одељење, воде, чета). Правила су, према мишљењу аутора написана на основу стечених искуства не само у Чеченском рату већ, пре свега у рату у Сирији. Према мишљењу аутора и трупни официри са којима је разговарао кажу да је нова доктрина веома важан и добро састављен документ. По први пут, доктрина одражава најновије борбена искуства и тренутне трендове ратне вештине.

RUSSIAN GROUND FORCES RECEIVE REVOLUTIONARY COMBAT DOCTRINES


Written by Pavel Ivanov; Originally appeared at VPK, translated by J.Hawk exclusively for SouthFront

Ground Forces experienced an event whose importance can hardly be overestimated. A new set of combat doctrines has entered into force.

Traditionally it includes three books. Part one covers operations of regiments, divisions, and brigades. This document is classified. The second part deals with the company and battalion level. The third is intended for the platoon, squad, individual tank.

Formally, these doctrines are considered temporary. But that’s no reason for concern. For example, when the Rosgvardiya was being formed, MVD doctrines also were temporary.

The new doctrines were approved in September 2017. But they began to arrive in line formations only this September. It’s noteworthy that they are propagated mainly in electronic form, through the “military internet”, a closed channel for data transmission.

Even now these documents are being called “revolutionary” in the field. One of the officers who spoke with VPK even joked that, upon reading them, he exclaimed “That’s not my army’s doctrine”. This underscores the degree to which they change the tactics of combined arms forces. Traditionally, the platoon-squad-tank manual has been the smallest of the three. This time it’s the second in size.

Doctrine Q&D

Since the early 2000’s, Ground Forces exchanged doctrinal documents three times. These documents were a good reflection of reforms in the Armed Forces.

Until 2005, Russian combined arms forces used doctrinal documents adopted in USSR. But they did not incorporate experience gathered by Russian motorized riflemen and tankment in local conflicts on the territory of former USSR and in two Chechen campaigns.

The main platoon tactical formation specified in the 1989 doctrine was a skirmish line. Operating by pairs, threes, fours, were not included in the doctrine. Even though they were adopted in Afghanistan.

The 2005 doctrine were an attempt to deal with these shortcomings. Formally, the whole doctrine set was adopted with a single order, but were distributed to troop units only gradually. The first sets were sent to the 42nd Guards Motorized Rifle Division in Chechnya even before the doctrine was officially approved. The remaining units received them only in 2006, and even then only the second part.

The first part was sent six months later. And the “Platoon, Squad, Tank” part was distributed only in 2007-08. Although by then the development of new doctrinal documents had begun.

Tactics outlined in the 2005 doctrine did not change greatly. There were new chapters on units and formations participating in local conflicts. But by and large these new additions were superficial. They provided general outlines of functions of platoons, companies, battalions, regiments, and divisions during armed conflicts. The main tactical operation types were search-and-reconnaissance, and also checkpoint duty.

The next doctrine set took nearly six years. Even while it was written it underwent significant changes. This effort began simultaneously with Anatoliy Serdyukov’s “new look” reforms. All the tactics were developed for the newly formed motor rifle and tank brigades.

The “brigade, regiment, division” part was particularly difficult. After all, the reforms reduced the number of regiments and divisions which were replaced by brigades. The first provisional doctrinal documents for the “new look” formations were ready in 2011. But they were sent to troop units only for familiarization. Ground Forces continued to “fight” using the 2005 doctrine.

In 2012, Serdyukov was replaced as the Defense Minister by Sergey Shoygu, and the “new look” reform was shut down. The Armed Forces saw a different transformation. Therefore doctrinal documents had to be rewritten once again. Regiments and divisions were returning in place of brigades.

The final combat doctrine set was approved in 2-14. It for the first time contained separate provisions for the employment of sniper teams.

This issue was a problem for the Ground Forces for a long time. Snipers used to be part of motorized rifle squads and platoons, and were subordinated directly to their respective commanders. Later snipers were concentrated in special sniper companies directly under brigade command. During combat operations, sniper platoons would be assigned to motor rifle battalions.

The Syria Adjustment
Why did the doctrine have to be changed once again after three years? The answer is obviouis. The new documents incorporated Syria operational experience. This becomes clear even after superficial examination with the doctrine. For obvious reasons, we are discussing only the second and third parts of the doctrine which are not classified.

The trend to expand the range of tactics used by squads and platoons was evident already in the 2005 and 2014 doctrines. But the 2017 doctrine the new tactics found their logical conclusion. The new edition breaks up the squad into fire and maneuver groups. The latter defeats the enemy in close combat using shock action and maneuver. The former renders fire support. The maneuver group consists of three riflemen (one of them the leader). The squad machine-gunner, anti-tank grenadier, and their two team members comprise the fire group.

The “Tactical-Level Combat System” pamphlet was the first publication which subdivided the squad into groups. It was issued in the late ‘00s. This organization proved its worth during practical field exercises. But only now has it been included in combat doctrine documents. A considerable amount of text is dedicated to describing how the groups operate during assault and clearance of fortifications. It is also noteworthy that the 2017 doctrine also allows for the squad to operate in a skirmish line if the situation requires it.

Motor rifle platoon tactics also underwent major change. It also can form several groups: command, fire support, and combat vehicle. The first includes the commander, his vehicle, and communications personnel. The second consists of attached fire support weapons such as automatic grenade launchers and anti-tank missiles. The 2017 doctrine pays particular attention to the operations of reinforced motor rifle platoons.

The combat vehicle group is an interesting novelty. If needed, the platoon commander can detach combat vehicles from their squads and form a reserve of sorts. It can be used to support advancing squads by fire and maneuver. In defense, it may be used to prevent enemy breakthrough.

Companies and battalions form so-called fire ambushes. Their task is to eliminate as much enemy personnel and equipment as possible, using point-blank fire and minefields.

The ambush may be conducted by a squad or a platoon, reinforced with flame launchers, combat engineers, and also remote minelayers. In addition to the squad or platoon, a fire ambush also utilizes several groups: decoy (the first to open fire in order to attract attention), cover (protects the main forces during their withdrawal from battle) and interdiction (prevents reaction forces from reaching the ambush).

The new doctrine also dedicates much attention to urban warfare. And while earlier these chapters were written on the basis of the Great Patriotic War experience, the 2017 doctrine clearly reflects the battles in Syria’s cities.

In particular, the Middle East experience is evident in the chapters on the defensive strongpoints. It mentions the echeloned squad deployment (one squad per building floor). Each echelon is responsible for engaging targets at a specific range from the strongpoint. The higher, the longer the engagement range.

When creating a strongpoint, it is recommended to seal unneeded windows. Bricks can be used to create firing ports and protection. A mortar should be placed on the roof. Particular attention should be paid to communications lines and underground passageways.

It is noteworthy that a strongpoint can be set up outside a building as well. In that case one should build barricades. The strongpoint should block streets and roads, exits from parks and city squares.

When attacking, motor rifle platoons are subdivided into maneuver and fire groups. Each is assigned one side of the street. Tanks and infantry fighting vehicles operate from behind them, providing fire support. For the first time, doctrine specifies how rooms should be stormed.

The 2017 doctrine seriously re-evaluates the participation of army units in internal conflicts. Formally, combined arms formations have the same missions as in international conflict. They block areas, conduct search and recon missions, man strongpoints. But tactics are entirely different. For example, there is a complex algorithm for search and recon. Several lines are formed, there are foot patrols, inspection teams, cover teams.

Checkpoint duty is also more nuanced. They have been transformed into de-facto mini-fortresses. Their task is to prevent the free movement of militants, seal-off an area, and ensure security of important facilities.

Roving Snipers
The motor rifle platoon is reinforced with a sniper team of two, and a company with a group. Formally the group or pair are subordinate to their respective unit commanders. But these commanders do not direct the snipers’ actions. They indicate the area of operations, brief on the unit mission, identify areas and sites to focus on. The commander also provides the snipers with challenge-password information.

From then on the snipers operate autonomously. They establish a base where they rest and prepare for action. They establish the main and reserve firing positions themselves.

The snipers’ task is to destroy important targets: commanders, ATGM crews, machinegunners, AT grenadiers and, please note, drones. Interestingly, the authors of the doctrine noted the psychological impact on the enemy, who knows that there are high-precision shooters operating in the area, as an important component of snipers’ work,

The description of how pairs and groups operate is interesting as well. As you know, the Russian Ground Forces do not differentiate between snipers and spotters. Therefore one of the snipers is designated as a spotter, working with one, two, or perhaps even three snipers. Then the position is rotated.

Paid For With Blood
The most valuable assessment of the new doctrine is what the military servicemembers are saying about it. Not for naught they are saying that every line in the doctrine is written with blood. Every officer VPK spoke to said that the new doctrine is a very important and well put together document. For the first time, the doctrine reflects the most recent combat experience, and the current military art trends.
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