During the maneuvers, the Russians had at their disposal all sorts of the missile and artillery assets such as Tunguska anti-aircraft system, Pantry S-1 system, Tochka-U missile system, Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) and BM-21 Grad, self-propelled howitzers (Msta and Akatsiya) as well as self-propelled artillery (Pion). As for the aviation, it was represented by the Su-24 bombers and various types of attack helicopters, namely Mi-24, Mi-28 and Ka-52. The maneuvers constituted an opportunity to present and test new types of weaponry. Moreover, the Russian took advantage of testing T-72B3 tanks on such a massive scale. In February this year, the first batch of twenty upgraded tanks was introduced within the Western Military District. The production of the most recent version of T-72 tanks started last year. Also such types of tanks as T-90M and T80BWM as well as BMPT armoured fighting vehicles appeared in the Russian army. As for the Belarusians, they could boast of the V1 light armoured vehicle, Caiman armoured vehicle and an upgraded T-72BM3 tank.
They also tested a system based on reservists of so-called “territorial defence forces”. Also sudden call-up to service for the duration of the exercise appeared to be absolutely top secret. It is known that it took place in Kaliningrad Oblast and Pskov Oblast. In April this year, Vladimir Putin signed a decree on call-up of reservists.
In spite of many concerns, there were no major instances of border violation, with the exception of brief incursion into the Lithuanian airspace done by two Il-76 transport airlifters on September 16. The incident occurred when the Russian aircrafts flew from Russia to Kaliningrad Oblast. As a result, Lithuania’s Foreign Ministry sent a note of complaint to the Russian Embassy. However, Moscow explained that the aircrafts sought to avoid the storm. There were no other provocations, neither directed into the members of NATO nor into Ukraine. Nevertheless, due to the Zapad drills, the latter intensified aerial patrols on its northern border.
For the Kremlin, the Russian army’s combat readiness and its potential is not important; it is more relevant to fill Western countries with fear. That is why the Zapad 2017 drills relied mostly on the information. Russia’s willingness to impress the West was greater than the number of soldiers and the type of weaponry. In this context, the Ukraine’s almost hysterical allegations appeared positive for Russia. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow’s main weapon is not the strength of its army, but the fear of other countries. Such a fear is often exaggerated or even unmotivated. It is one of two main reasons (as for the second one, it is the desire to keep some military issues top secret) behind Russia’s unclear attitude during the maneuvers. The country accepted foreign observers on its territory only once; on 18 September, Vladimir Putin, Sergei Shoygu, the Russian generals, many foreign journalists and 95 military attachés appeared at the Luzhsky proving ground located in Leningrad Oblast. Due to the terrible weather, they probably didn’t see a lot. For foreign observers, it was much easier to monitor the maneuvers taking place on the territory of Belarus. On September 17, fourteen onlookers from seven countries had an opportunity to inspect only some maneuvers at the Ruzhansky proving ground in Brest Oblast. For many years, Russia had led some unclear activities, not only the military ones (in this case, Russia’s decision on suspension of Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe seemed extremely important). In this respect, the Zapad 2017 drills were exceptional, not only with regard to Russia’s policy towards NATO and Ukraine but also to Belarus.
The maneuvers’ aim was not to show the allies’ unity. On the contrary, Moscow tried to discredit Belarus, mostly due to some of its provocations. For example, Russia informed that additional armoured forces had been transported on the territory of Belarus, which appeared troublesome for Minsk. Another problematic issue was a car convoy with Russian nationalists driving through the Belarusian capital. It needs to be added that the event had not been arranged with local authorities. Good relations between Belarus and Ukraine have been recently deteriorated right before the start of Zapad 2017 as the Russian FSB kidnapped son of a Ukrainian military. The incident took place in the territory of Belarus.
On September 14, that is during the first day of the exercises, Russia’s Defence Ministry announced on its website that subunits of the Western Military District had launched a trooping operation to Belarus and the soldiers of the 1st Guards Tank Army who stationed near Moscow were put on high alert and were even directed to a loading point. As published in the press release, troops would act at unknown proving grounds and tanks would be transported within a day. Such a state of matters appeared to be surprising for the Belarusians and some oppositon activists even rushed towards the border to block the Russian transport. Of course, it didn’t happen. In the course of consultation with the Russians, Minsk explained that the press release had contained an error. It was true that units were transported at Russian, and not Belarusian, proving grounds. Such was the official version but it was clear that Moscow wanted to test how Belarus would react to a potential deployment of Russian troops on its territory. Judging by the reaction of Minsk, Russia has passed the test. The Belarusian authorities appeared to be surprising and indecisive when the car convoy with Russian People’s Liberation Movement had driven through the capital.
Thanks to Zapad 2017, Moscow could notice that the vast majority of Belarusians have either neutral or positive attitude to the Russian army. Their opponents did not manage to organise any important anti-Russian protests. If Moscow sought to test the degree of control and even the knowledge of Minsk about the current activities of the Russian troops in the Belarusian territory, it should be rather satisfied. It seems that the overwhelming majority of Belarusians do not take seriously into account the Russian threat, and, as for the information war, Moscow is able to paralyze the Belarusian public opinion.
Not only did such instances of conscious provocation help Moscow to test Belarus but they were also supposed to make Alexander Lukashenko resign from observing the drills along with Vladimir Putin. However, Russia’s president did not want to go to Belarus to do so. As a result, leaders of both countries observed the maneuvers separately, unlike in 2009 and 2013. Lukashenko was also humilitated by the fact that the Borisov proving ground (where the president of Belarus inspected the drills) was not visited by aforesaid Sergei Shoygu. It needs to be noted that Minsk and Moscow seemed to speak with different voices. Moreover, there was no one command so, in fact, Belarusians and Russians fought shoulder to shoulder but they did not act together. For the Kremlin, the cooperation with the Belarusian army was of minor importance in the context of Zapad 2017. This shows that Moscow, in its current military doctrine, counts mainly on itself and in Russia there is no longer any political demand for formal allies. In Minsk, it was felt that during the drills the Russians tried to present Belarus not as their ally but rather a satellite; a kind of a proving ground that can be used to attack their neighbours. Zapad 2017 has intensified Belarus’s distrust towards Russia. The drills have also complicated the Belarus’s relations with neighbouring countries. Not accidentally a dozen days after the maneuvers ended, the Belarusian side unexpectedly returned to one of its greatest fears expressed earlier in connection with the exercises. According to the Belarusian Foreign Minister, Vladimir Makei, his country had no intention of starting the war and it did not seek to deploy any foreign military bases in its territory.
Izvor:
https://warsawinstitute.org/zapad-2017-lessons-learned/