PALUBA

10.08.2011.
AFP


SAD su 10. avgusta izjavile da bi voleli da Kina objasni zbog čega joj je potreban nosač aviona, jer je SAD zabrinuta zbog manjka transparentnosti u oblasti vojnih ciljeva Kine.
PR Stejt Departmenta, Viktorija Noland, je na pitanje novinara da li će kineski nosač aviona podići tenzije u regionu, izjavila je da bi "SAD pozdravile bilo kakvo objašnjenje Kine zbog čega joj je potrebno ovakvo sredstvo vojne tehnike", kao i da je to "deo veće zabrinutosti što Kina nije transparentna prema ostalim zemljama. Kina nije transparentna u pogledu vojnog budžeta i vojnih ciljeva na način na kakav je transparentna SAD."









:krsta

Čitam i ne mogu da vjerujem... kakav bezobrazluk!
Da objasne šta će im jedan osrednji nosač?! Oholi su do besmisla.
Kažu da je Kina najveći američki povjerioc, neka razmisle malo šta rade i kako se ponašaju, ničija nije do zore gorela...

Мислим да ће кинески одговор бити: "А што не би могло"? + "Да нећеш да ми забраниш"?

^I bolji odgovor od toga ni ne zaslužuju. Šta oni misle, da imaju monopol sile nad čitavim svetom? Malo su prerano sebe proglasili Trećim Rimom i svetskom vladom. I ta njihova transparentnost...naravno, više i ne kriju da im 11 borbenih grupa treba da bi tukli svakog ko im se ne sviđa, ma gde se taj neko nalazio na ovoj planeti. Konačno se pojavio neko ko će im makar malo biti protiv-teža na svetskim okeanima.

Teško će im biti protivteža sa jednim nosačem aviona. Ali, od negde se mora početi. Biće im potrebni i prateći borodvi, sam nosač aviona  - ne biva :jok

Za sad je tako, ali polako na duge staze nadam se boljem. Kinezi su stara strpljiva civilizacija.
Znaju i oni za jadac. A s obzirom na svjetsku situaciju mislim da će odgovor biti, "Ko te š..a".

Mogu da pazare neki nosač i od Amera, da bi učili i sa Istoka i Zapada. Na konto dugovanja SAD....

:klap :klap

То ће и да буде за неку годину. САД ће га можда продати Тајвану, а ови уступити Кини.

Kako stoje stvari sada Ameri nece nikad prodati nosac aviona Tajvanu. Ali kljucna rec ovde je "...kako stoje stvari sada..." :) Ako ne smanje digove prodace oni i vise, ko Grcka.
Ono gore je klasicno diplomtasko 'zdirkavanje', i ona Americka potparolica mora da opravda platu. Sad ce i Kinezi da odbusaju nesto i to je to.
Ja moram da priznam da mene Kina plasi, i nemoje sad odma da me napadate da branim Amere :) 8 godina sam u Kanadi, na Americko tlo nisam nogu gazio.
Ali to je zemlja od 1.4 biliona ljudi, na prostoru koji je po resursima premal za njih. Brine to mene, ne bas da ne mogi da spavam uvece, ali brine me :)

Свака велика сила, без обзира на то каквом се сада или у будућности приказивала, треба да брине мале и слабе. Нису они увек тако фини. Умеју они да "убоду" испод стола. Наравно, увек слабије. Зато мали и слаби треба добро да гледају где ће та велика сила бити за 15-20 година и како ће се престројити да их сада доброћудни див не згази, што намерно што случајно, што економски, што политички. Брине она и друге, велике силе на пример (Русију понајпре, а сада све више и САД), али из других разлога. Искрено, та брига богатих и моћних мене баш претерано и не сикира. У том гушању великих можемо настрадати, али навикли смо. Међутим, можемо и профитирати. Не се знаје...

Генерално, смена на врху светске доминације ће се десити, пре или касније. То се до сада, историјски гледано, увек дешавало уз примену силе. Десиће се неминовно и у будућности. Само је питање доминантне врсте силе која ће се применити код "завршног" ударца. У таквим случајевима мали и слаби скоро увек награбусе. И ова економска криза управо то показује. Велики, богати и моћни су је узроковали - цех ће да плате мали, слаби и сиромашни.

Svi veliki jaki i moćni najmanje od svega su dobri. To tad oni smatraju nebitnim. Mi mali i onako nemožemo nijednima ništa.
Ostaje nam jedino to da virimo iz svoje rupice i navijamo za trenutno nešto slabijeg da najjačeg premlati do besvijesti.
A već sutra navijaćemo za nekog trećeg koji se sprema da ispuca ovog do juče drugorazrednog. To nam je sudbina i nema nam druge.
Svaki trenutno najjači bez obzira o kome se radi, Amer, Rus, Kinez, Svemirac.....u određenim okolnostima je nemilosrdan i zao, pogotovo kad osjeti da bi bio eventualno ugrožen. :dosada

Stvarno su čudo ovi ljudi, šta će Kini nosač aviona. :o

Interesantan članak:

CHINA’S AIRCRAFT CARRIER AMBITION

Much has been written over the past few years on China’s potential aircraft carrier program.
Recent assessments have ranged from ‘China does not have an aircraft carrier program’, to
‘China is to build Nimitz like Supercarriers’! It is more likely that China is indeed about to
build aircraft carriers, but cut from more conservative clothe than the Nimitz class, and that we
will see the first indigenous Chinese carrier by 2013. What has happened during the past 20 or
so years to get to this point?

First Steps

The purchase and study of the former Australian carrier HMAS Melbourne (1985), and
former Soviet carriers Minsk (1998) and Kiev (2000), were no doubt significant to the overall
aircraft carrier program and important tangible steps toward developing a carrier capability.
The purchase of the Varyag Project 1143.5 aircraft carrier (1998), however, was a far more
significant step and can be seen as a critical decision point for China to proceed with the
development of an aircraft carrier capability sooner rather than later. This is supported by the
manoeuvring and effort, if not the financial cost, China expended in getting the vessel. The
Varyag represented a relatively modern design, with a sister ship in active service, and a
vessel that could potentially be made usable. For a nation with no experience in operating
aircraft carriers the outlay for purchasing this ship was negligible, and combined with the
ability to take her time, the ideal way for China to develop an aircraft carrier capability. But
why would China want such a capability?

Rationale for a Carrier program

Before we attempt to determine what type of carrier China’s is trying to develop, and how
many will be built, we must first understand China’s rationale for developing this capability.
China will view the value of an aircraft carrier from both a political and military viewpoint,
both ways of increasing China’s Comprehensive National Power.

As I have mentioned in a previous paper (China’s Path to Power), aircraft carriers (amongst
other weapon systems) provide a country with significant prestige value. Port visits, to both
friends and potential enemies in order to ‘show the flag’, usually have a very important
impact. Those who have seen a Nimitz carrier come into port and berth, and get close to view
it can only be but impressed. The possession of such vessels also highlights the technological
capability of a nation, and the nation’s ability to undertake grand projects.
The military aspect of a Chinese carrier program is actually not as obvious as many might
think. Some observes have lampooned any future Chinese carrier program, arguing that 1)
China does not have the ability to build a Nimitz-style carrier, and 2) it will take China
decades to become as proficient as the US Navy in aircraft carrier operations! These
comments are of course correct but in my opinion they have led these observers to an
incorrect conclusion.

Their assessments appear to be based on the assumption that China plans a direct naval
encounter with the US, and that a central tactic in such an engagement will be carrier-oncarrier
battles. This is highly unlikely to be a Chinese operational concept, nor are they likely
to be drawn into such an engagement. We have all read extensively about China’s asymmetric
approach to conflict with a military superior enemy. I do not believe China seeks military
confrontation with the US. Should it come to that, and China wanted to target US carriers, it is
far more likely to employ conventional submarines, long range cruise missiles, and tactical
ballistic missile (if the complex targeting and course correction issues can be solved).
While China does have this asymmetric approach with regard to a stronger enemy, this does
not necessarily follow for an enemy that is military on a par with China! If this is true, what
military application might China see for an aircraft carrier? Are there realistic scenarios
where China would employ aircraft carriers to achieve a military objective?

One such scenario would be tension with India over energy supplies, one that required a
Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. India would have to be careful as to what assets
it deployed against a Chinese naval force as some forces would have to be held in reserve
against a possible intervention by Pakistan. China, too, would be limited as her substantial
land-based air assets would most likely not be brought into play (unless sufficient warning
time and political manoeuvering allowed basing in Pakistan or Myanmar). China’s surface
action combatants, such as the Sovremenny DDGs, as well as submarines, both SSNs and
SSKs, should provide a sufficient threat to Indian ships, with an aircraft carrier required only
to provide fighter cover, AEW and ASW capability.

Another scenario would be initial operations against Taiwan. This may seem contradictory as
I have previous stated that China does not need aircraft carriers for operations against Taiwan.
While I maintain this point, I also maintain that aside from maintenance of the State,
reunification of Taiwan is the most important issue for China, and any weapon system that
can help to achieve that will be encouraged. There is no doubt that an aircraft carrier would
certainly help in at least providing fighter cover over parts of Taiwan for longer than landbased
fighters operating out of China.

A third scenario would be conflict in the South China Sea over the Paracel or Spratly Islands.
Given the distance from mainland Chinese bases, and the lack of airfields on the Islands (only
one in the Paracel Islands on Woody Island), an ability to maintain fighter cover for extended
periods would be crucial to the success of operations.

Fourthly, it is China’s intention to be able to conduct operations out to the ‘second island
chain’1, and the possession of aircraft carriers would provide the air support that would be
required for such operations.

Finally, an aircraft carrier represents a “force-in-being”, and therefore something that military
planners must also take into consideration, even if those planners consider it unlikely to be
employed against them.

For all these more plausible scenarios, the capability required for a Chinese aircraft carrier
remains the same, that is; a focus on air superiority, ASW and AEW roles, and a limited
requirement for surface attack (be it land or sea targets).

What type of Carrier?

So what type of aircraft carrier does China need to achieve both the political and military
aims? It is possible that China is studying two potential designs; a 40,000-50,000 tonne carrier
based on the Varyag layout (STOBAR concept) as a first step for training and trials, and a
fully combat capable 93,000 tonne CTOBAR design (a la US carriers)2.
I mentioned early about the impression a Nimitz carrier leaves on the public (and
governments). These vessels are however very complex to both build and operate. It is
unlikely that China is about to develop a similar sized or capable vessel, as they represent far
more than what is needed for the assessed requirement! Nor would it be logical to assess that
China, given its generally more patient and focused approach to capability development,
would opt for such a difficult, risky and resource intensive approach. Even if the Russians did
provide detailed plans for the Ulyanovsk Project 1147.3 aircraft carrier, China would still have
to develop catapult technology and nuclear propulsion for a very large surface vessel.
It is more likely that the political and military purpose for a Chinese aircraft carrier can be
achieved by building what would essentially be a copy of the Varyag (or Shi Lang as the ship
has allegedly been named3). This course of action would also deliver a significant capability
(albeit far below that of the US Navy, but on a par with other aircraft carrier capable nations),
in the shortest period of time and with the lowest level of risk (both from a project delivery
and operational point of view).

I say essentially a copy of the Shi Lang as I would foresee two minor but significant changes.
Firstly, it is likely (given the assessed operational employment), that a future Chinese carrier
would not have the long range anti-ship missiles as the Varyag was designed to accommodate
(the SS-N-19 system). China would have to develop an entirely new weapon system if this
was to remain part of the design. The extensive surface to air missile (SAM) armament4
however could well be retained given the carrier’s role as primarily an air defence ship, and
the limited number of SAMs able to be deployed to support the carrier. Secondly, and
particularly due to the Chinese ability to plan well into the future, it may well be that China
will be influenced by Britain’s new CVF (Queen Elizabeth Class) and fit an indigenous
carrier with a removable Ski Jump in order to future proof the design. This would allow
China to operate the carrier now with ramp-capable aircraft, and provide time to develop a
conventional take off fighter and catapult launch system, which would lengthen the
operational life of the ship. Interestingly it has been mentioned that China may attempt to
utilise magnetic levitation technology, as used on the MagLev train which operates from
Shanghai’s Pudong airport to the city, in order to develop a catapult launch system.

How Many?

The general rule of thumb is that a country would need three aircraft carriers in order to
maintain at least one operational carrier at any time (it is interesting to note however that apart
from the US no other country plans to have more than two carriers for the foreseeable future).

It is reasonable to assess that the most China can achieve with the Shi Lang is as a training
carrier, with an emergency operational role. If so China may then build two new carriers,
therefore allowing for one continually available. The assessment of two new carriers is also
supported by two recent developments. The first of these is China’s reported purchase of four
carrier landing systems5. The report states that one will be used for a land-based training
facility, one for the Shi Lang, and two for new build carriers. In addition recent construction
of large naval vessels suggests a Chinese approach to building classes comprising two ships,
and then producing improved versions incrementally6. The second development is the
reported purchase of up to 50 Su-33s.

When a country purchases aircraft, it normally ascertains how many operational squadrons it
needs, a proportional number for training purposes, and an attrition reserve (size dependant
upon a number of factors, including whether the country produces the aircraft itself or not).
The Su-33 complement on the Kuznetzov is given as 12, out of a total compliment of
approximately 50 aircraft8. 50 Su-33s would allow a force of 12 aircraft per carrier (bearing in
mind that the Shi Lang’s compliment would also represent the training component), a small
land-based training element, and an attrition reserve to suffice until an indigenous carrier
aircraft could be developed (most likely a development of the J10 or J11). Russia for example
has a force of 24 Su-33s to support its sole carrier, Kuznetsov9, but utilises the Su-25 as a
carrier training aircraft. Unless China purchases similar Su-25s, or develops a carrier capable
training (unlikely in the short term), China may have to purchase the two seat (side-by-side)
version of the naval Flanker, the Su-33UB, as part of any potential Su-33 purchase.

When

It is reasonable to conclude that the Shi Lang is being prepared as a showpiece for the Beijing
Olympics, and so will be ready by August 2008. When I say ‘ready’ here I do not mean fully
capable, even in a training role, but rather to sail under its own power with aircraft onboard (if
not actually able to launch fixed wing aircraft). Such a timeline would be consistent with the
‘political’ role, if not the military role, of the vessel. It is quite possible that any construction
of an indigenous aircraft carrier, or even acknowledgement of such a program, would wait
until after the Olympics have concluded, thus giving a completion (but not operational)
timeline of around 2013 (if we accept that long lead items have already been ordered).
It is interesting to compare India’s approach to developing an indigenous aircraft carrier.
While already a carrier capable nation the Indian purchase of the Admiral Gorshkov (INS
Vikramaditya), and Mig-29K aircraft, represents a far riskier and less capable entry into
operating bigger aircraft carriers. It is also a far more expensive approach. The Shi Lang cost
approximately USD$30 million (purchase and towing fees) to get it to China10. Certainly
there is much work to be done to make the ship operational, and we may never know the final
cost. What we do know, and the real benefit to China, is that the development and
modernisation skills that will flow from this will directly assist future Chinese carrier
construction. Contrariwise, India is paying between USD$900 to USD$1350 million to have
their former Soviet carrier modified in a Russian shipyard, and it is not likely to be
operational until 201011.

Conclusion

The production of aircraft carriers based on a design that China has studied up close for many
years, and one that a friend (Russia) operates, presents a low risk solution. So to does the
purchase of aircraft (Su-33s) that have a proven operational record off the very carrier China
now has, as well as an aircraft that is essentially the same as hundreds of other aircraft it
already operates (the Su-27 family).

This line of thought argues against the likelihood of China building a Nimitz-style carrier in
the near term. The Chinese, as pragmatic as they are, would have conducted something akin
to a cost-benefit analysis, and asked themselves ‘What would we achieve for such a huge
financial outlay’, especially given other priority projects12. While the argument for building a
bigger ship is strong – ‘steel is cheap and air is free’ – the argument for prioritising
development of catapult technology, not to mention nuclear propulsion for a large surface
vessel, is not. China may well have come to the conclusion previously stated: that a Nimitzstyle
carrier is far larger than what is operationally needed, it would be resource intensive, and
most importantly it would be a risky proposition that could lead to failure, something that
China could never accept. A Varyag-sized carrier, as described above, would provide a
platform as capable as any non-US carrier, with the possible exception of the future French
carrier.

Should the recent Russia statement of intent to build aircraft carriers be more than rhetoric,
and intensive collaboration with China follow, it would be likely that future Chinese carriers
would be larger and equipped with catapults. Time would seem to be against this for China’s
first two indigenous aircraft carriers.

Izvor: http://www.sinodefence.com/research/aircraft-carrier/China_Aircraft_Carrier_Ambition.pdf

Mogao sam im i ja kraće odgovoriti: Pa da nosi kineske avione. ;D

:super :super :super

Svaka čast Ćiro, nasmejao si me do suza. Imaš piće kad se vidimo.  :super

Važi, spremi hladnu koktu (nesmem radi ove omladine, da se ne navikne na žestoko). ;D

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSQ4SgUPURE

Evo ga i Japan se trti... i on hoće "objašnjenje"

Japan's defense minister called on China on Aug. 12 to explain why it needs an aircraft carrier, after Beijing sparked increased concerns over its military expansion by starting sea trials for the vessel.

"As an aircraft carrier, it is of a highly maneuverable and offensive nature. We want China to explain the reasons why it needs it," Toshimi Kitazawa told reporters.

"There is no doubt that it will have a big impact on the region," he added.

China put the revamped Soviet-built aircraft carrier Varyag to sea on Aug. 10, prompting the United States to call for an explanation.

Beijing has sought to play down the vessel's capability, saying it will mainly be used for training and "research."

In its annual defense report last week, Japan expressed concern over China's growing assertiveness and widening naval reach in nearby waters and the Pacific and over what it called the "opaqueness" of Beijing's military budget.

China criticized the report as "irresponsible," insisting its drive to modernize its forces was entirely defensive.


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Ako su tridesetih godina prošlog veka davali Kini objašnjenje za svoje nosače, onda će verovatno sada dobiti.... objašnjenje.

Njima bi bolje bilo da misle o silnoj radijaciji koja već skoro pola godine šiklja iz Fukušime. Dok Kinezi osposobe taj nosač i kompletiraju borbenu grupu, pola Japana će poumirati od leukemije i ostalih pratećih pojava tako intenzivne radijacije.